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Abstract In many dynamic open systems, agents have to interact with one another to
achieve their goals. Here, agents may be self-interested, and when trusted to perform an
actionfor another,may betraythat trust bynot performingthe action asrequired.In addition,
due to the size of such systems, agents will often interact with other agents with which they
have little or no past experience. There is therefore a need to develop a model of trust and
reputation that will ensure good interactions among software agents in large scale open sys-
tems.Againstthisbackground,wehavedevelopedTRAVOS (TrustandReputationmodelfor
Agent-based Virtual OrganisationS) which models an agent’s trust in an interaction partner.
Speciﬁcally, trust is calculated using probability theory taking account of past interactions
between agents, and when there is a lack of personal experience between agents, the model
draws upon reputation information gathered from third parties. In this latter case, we pay
particular attention to handling the possibility that reputation information may be inaccurate.
Keywords Trust · Reputation · Probabilistic trust
1. Introduction
Computational systems of all kinds are moving toward large-scale, open, dynamic and dis-
tributed architectures, which harbour numerous self-interested agents. The Grid is perhaps
the most prominent example of such an environment, but others include pervasive comput-
ing, peer-to-peer networks, and the Semantic Web. In all of these environments, the concept
of self-interest is endemic and introduces the possibility of agents interacting in a way to
maximise their own gain (perhaps at the cost of another). It is therefore essential to ensure
good interactions between agents so that no single agent can take advantage of others. In
this sense, good interactions are those in which the expectations of the interacting agents are
fulﬁlled; for example, if the expectation of one agent is recorded as a contract that is then
satisfactorily fulﬁlled by its interaction partner, it is a good interaction.
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We view the Grid as a multi-agent system (MAS) in which autonomous software agents,
owned by various organisations, interact with each other. In particular, many of the inter-
actions between agents are conducted in terms of virtual organisations (VOs), which are
collections of agents (representing individuals or organisations), each of which has a range
of problem-solving capabilities and resources at its disposal. A VO is formed when there is
a need to solve a problem or provide a resource that a single agent cannot address. Here, the
difﬁculty of assuring good interactions between individual agents is further complicated by
the size of the Grid, and the large number of agents and interactions between them. Never-
theless, the solution to this problem is integral to the wide-scale acceptance of the Grid and
agent-based VOs [5].
It is now well established that computational trust is important in such open systems [13,
9, 16]. Speciﬁcally, trust provides a form of social control in environments in which agents
are likely to interact with others whose intentions are not known, and allows agents within
such systems to reason about the reliability of others. More speciﬁcally, trust can be utilised
to account for uncertainty about the willingness and capability of other agents to perform
actions as agreed, rather than defecting when it proves to be more proﬁtable. For the purpose
of this paper, we adapt Gambetta’s deﬁnition [6], and deﬁne trust to be a particular level of
subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent will perform a par-
ticular action, both before the assessing agent can monitor such an action and in a context
in which it affects the assessing agent’s own action.
Trust is often built up over time by accumulating personal experience with others; we use
this experience to judge how agents will perform in an as yet unobserved situation. However,
when assessing trust in an individual with whom we have no direct personal experience, we
oftenaskothersabouttheirexperienceswiththatindividual.Thiscollectiveopinionofothers
regarding an individual is known as the individual’s reputation, which we use to assess its
trustworthiness, if we have no personal experience of it.
Given the importance of trust and reputation in open systems and their use as a form of
social control, several computational models of trust and reputation have been developed,
each tailored to the domain to which they apply (see [13] for a review of such models). In
our case, the requirements can be summarised as follows.
– First, the model must provide a trust metric that represents a level of trust in an agent.
Such a metric allows comparisons between agents so that one agent can be inferred as
more trustworthy than another. The model must be able to provide a trust metric given
the presence or absence of personal experience.
– Second, the model must reﬂect an individual’s conﬁdence in its level of trust for another
agent. This is necessary so that an agent can determine the degree of inﬂuence of the
trust metric on the decision about whether to interact with another individual. Generally
speaking, higher conﬁdence means a greater impact on the decision-making process, and
lower conﬁdence means less impact.
– Third, an agent must not assume that the opinions of others are accurate or based on
actual experience. Thus, the model must be able to discount the opinions of others in
the calculation of reputation, based on past reliability of opinion providers. However,
existing models do not generally allow an agent to effectively assess the reliability of an
opinion source and use the assessment to discount the opinion provided by that source.
To meet the above requirements, we have developed TRAVOS, a trust and reputation
model for agent-based VOs, as described in this paper, which is organised as follows.
Section 2 presents the basic TRAVOS model, and Section 3 then provides a description of
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opinions from opinion sources. Empirical evaluation of these mechanisms is presented in
Section 4. Section 5 presents related work, and Section 6 concludes.
2. The TRAVOS model
TRAVOS equips an agent (the truster) with two methods for assessing the trustworthiness
of another agent (the trustee) in a given context. First, the truster can make the assessment
based on its previous direct interactions with the trustee. Second, the truster may assess
trustworthiness based on the reputation of the trustee.
2.1. Basic notation
In a MAS consisting of n agents, we denote the set of all agents as A ={ a1,a2,...,an}.
Over time, distinct pairs of agents {ax,ay}⊆A may interact with one another, governed
by contracts that specify the obligations of each agent towards its interaction partner. Here,
and in the rest of this discussion, we assume that all interactions take place under similar
obligations. This is because an agent may behave differently when asked to provide one type
of service over another, and so the best indicator of how an agent will perform under certain
obligations in the future is how it performed under similar obligations in the past. Therefore,
the assessment of a trustee under different obligations is best treated separately. In any case,
an interaction between a truster, atr ∈ A,a n dat r u s t e e ,ate ∈ A, is considered successful
by atr if ate fulﬁls its obligations. From the perspective of atr, the outcome of an interac-
tion between atr and ate is summarised by a binary variable,1 Oatr,ate,w h e r eOatr,ate = 1
indicates a successful (and Oatr,ate = 0 indicates an unsuccessful) interaction2 for atr (see
Equation 1). We denote an outcome observed at time t as Ot
atr,ate, and the set of all outcomes
observed from time 1 to time t as O1:t
atr,ate. Here, each point in time is a natural number,
{t : t ∈ Z,t > 0},inwhichatmostoneinteractionbetweenanygivenpairofagentsmaytake
place.Therefore, O1:t
atr,ate isasetofatmostt binaryvariablesrepresentingalltheinteractions
that have taken place between atr and ate up to and including time t.
Oatr,ate =

1 if contract is fulﬁlled by ate
0 otherwise (1)
At any point of time t, the history of interactions between agentsatr andate is recorded as
a tuple, Rt
atr,ate = (mt
atr,ate,nt
atr,ate) where the value of mt
atr,ate is the number of successful
interactions for atr with ate, while nt
atr,ate is the number of unsuccessful interactions. The
tendency of an agent ate to fulﬁl or default on its obligations is governed by its behaviour,
which we represent as a variable Batr,ate ∈[ 0,1]. Here, Batr,ate speciﬁes the intrinsic prob-
ability that ate will fulﬁl its obligations during an interaction with atr (see Equation 2). For
example, if Batr,ate = 0.5t h e nate is expected to break half of its contracts with atr, resulting
in half the interactions between ate and atr being unsuccessful from the perspective of atr.
Batr,ate = p(Oatr,ate = 1), where Batr,ate ∈[ 0,1] (2)
1 Representing a contract outcome with a binary variable is a simpliﬁcation made for the purpose of our
model. We concede that, in certain circumstances, a more expressive representation may be appropriate. This
is part of our future work.
2 The outcome of an interaction from the perspective of one agent is not necessarily the same as that from the
perspective of its interaction partner. Thus, it is possible that Oatr,ate  = Oate,atr.186 Auton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 12: 183–198
In TRAVOS, the trust of an agent atr in an agent ate, denoted τatr,ate,i satr’s estimate of the
probability that ate will fulﬁl its obligations to atr during an interaction. The conﬁdence of
atr in its assessment of ate is denoted as γatr,ate. In this context, conﬁdence is a metric that
represents the accuracy of the trust value calculated by an agent given the number of obser-
vations (the evidence) it uses in the trust value calculation. Intuitively, more evidence results
in higher conﬁdence. The precise deﬁnitions and reasons behind these values are discussed
below.
2.2. Modelling trust and conﬁdence
The ﬁrst basic requirement of a computational trust model is that it should provide a metric
for comparing the relative trustworthiness of different agents. From our deﬁnition of trust,
we consider an agent to be trustworthy if it has a high probability of performing a particular
action which, in our context, is to fulﬁl its obligations during an interaction. This probability
is unavoidably subjective, because it can only be assessed from the individual viewpoint of
the truster, based on the truster’s personal experiences.
In light of this, we adopt a probabilistic approach to modelling trust, based on the expe-
riences of an agent in the role of a truster. If a truster, atr, has complete information about a
trustee, ate then, according to atr, the probability that ate fulﬁls its obligations is expressed
by Batr,ate. In general, however, complete information cannot be assumed, and according
to the Bayesian view [4], the best we can do is to use the expected value of Batr,ate given
the knowledge of atr. In particular, we consider the knowledge of atr to be the set of all
interactionoutcomesithasobserved.However,inadoptingaBayesianratherthanfrequentist
stance,weallowforthepossibilitythatatrustermayuseotherpriorinformationinitsassess-
ment,particularlyduringbootstrapping,whenfewobservationsofatrusteeareavailable(see
Section 6). Thus, we deﬁne the level of trust τatr,ate at time t as the expected value of Batr,ate
given the set of outcomes O1:t
atr,ate. This is expressed using standard statistical notation in
Equation 3.
τatr,ate = E[Batr,ate|O1:t
atr,ate] (3)
In order to determine this expected value, we need a probability distribution, deﬁned by a
probability density function (pdf), which is used to model the relative probability that Batr,ate
will have a certain value. In Bayesian analysis, the beta family of pdfs is commonly used
as a prior distribution for random variables that take on continuous values in the interval
[0,1]. For example, beta pdfs can be used to model the distribution of a random variable
representing the unknown probability of a binary event [2] where Batr,ate is an example of
such a variable. For this reason, beta pdfs which have also been applied in previous work in
the domain of trust (see Section 5), are also used in our model.
The standard formula for beta distributions is given in Equation 4, in which two param-
eters, α and β deﬁne the shape of the density function when plotted.3 Example plots can
be seen in Fig. 1, in which the horizontal axis represents the possible values of Batr,ate,a n d
the vertical axis gives the relative probability that each of these values is the true value for
Batr,ate. The most likely value of Batr,ate is the curve maximum, while the shape of the curve
representsthedegreeofuncertaintyoverthetruevalueof Batr,ate.Ifα andβ bothhavevalues
close to 1, a wide density plot results, indicating a high level of uncertainty about Batr,ate.
3 The denominator in Equation 4 is a normalising constant, which is used to fulﬁl the constraint that the
deﬁnite integral of a probability distribution must be equal to 1.Auton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 12: 183–198 187
Fig. 1 Example beta plots, showing how the beta curve shape changes with the parameters α and β
In the extreme case of α = β = 1, the distribution is uniform, with all values of Batr,ate
considered equally likely.
f (Batr,ate|α,β) =
(Batr,ate)α−1(1−Batr,ate)β−1
 1
0 Uα−1(1−U)β−1dU , where α,β > 0 (4)
Against this background, we now show how to calculate the value of τatr,ate b a s e do nt h e
interaction outcomes observed by atr.F i r s t ,w em u s tﬁ n dv a l u e sf o rα and β that represent
the beliefs of atr about ate. Assuming that, prior to observing any interaction outcomes with
ate, atr believes that all possible values for Bate are equally likely, then atr’s initial settings
for α and β are α = β = 1. Based on standard techniques, the parameter settings in light of
observations are achieved by adding the number of successful outcomes to the initial setting
of α, and the number of unsuccessful outcomes to β. In our notation, this is given in Equa-
tion 5. Then the ﬁnal value for τatr,ate is calculated by applying the standard equation for the
expected value of a beta distribution (see Equation 6) to these parameter settings.
α = m1:t
atr,ate + 1a n dβ = n1:t
atr,ate + 1w h e r e t is the time of assessment (5)
E[Batr,ate|α,β]=
α
α + β
(6)
On its own, τatr,ate does not differentiate between cases in which a truster has adequate infor-
mationaboutatrusteeandcasesinwhichitdoesnot.Intuitively,observingmanyoutcomesof
a given type of event is likely to lead to a more accurate estimate of such an event’s outcome.
This creates the need for an agent to be able to measure its conﬁdence in its value of trust,
for which we deﬁne a conﬁdence metric, γatr,ate, as the posterior probability that the actual
value of Batr,ate lies within an acceptable margin of error   about τatr,ate. This is calculated
using Equation 7, which can intuitively be interpreted as the proportion of the probability
distributionthatliesbetweenthebounds(τatr,ate− )and(τatr,ate+ ).Theerror  inﬂuences
the conﬁdence value an agent calculates for a given set of observations. That is, for a given
set of observations, a larger value of   causes a larger proportion of the beta distribution to
fall in the range [τatr,ate −  ,τatr,ate +  ], so resulting in a large value for γatr,ate.
γatr,ate =
 τatr,ate+ 
τatr,ate−  Xα−1(1 − X)β−1dX
 1
0 Uα−1(1 − U)β−1dU
(7)188 Auton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 12: 183–198
2.3. Modelling reputation
Untilnow,wehaveonlyconsideredhowanagentusesitsowndirectobservationstocalculate
a level of trust. However, in certain circumstances, it may also be appropriate for a truster to
seek third party opinions, in order to boost the information it has available on which to assess
a trustee. In particular, if the truster has a low conﬁdence level in its assessment, based only
onitsownexperience,thenseekingthirdpartyopinionsmaysigniﬁcantlyboosttheaccuracy
ofitsassessment.However,ifthetrusterhassigniﬁcantﬁrst-handexperiencewiththetrustee,
then the risk of obtaining misleading opinions, and any communication cost involved, may
outweigh any small increase in accuracy that may be gained.
In light of this, we use conﬁdence values to specify a decision-making process in an agent
to lead it to seek more evidence when required. In TRAVOS, an agent atr calculates τatr,ate
based on its personal experiences with ate. If this value of τatr,ate has a corresponding con-
ﬁdence, γatr,ate, which is below that of a predetermined minimum conﬁdence level, denoted
θγ,t h e natr will seek the opinions of other agents about ate to boost its conﬁdence above θγ.
These collective opinions form ate’s reputation and, by seeking it, atr can effectively obtain
a larger set of observations.
The true opinion of a source aop ∈ A at time t, about the trustee ate, is the tuple,
Rt
aop,ate = (mt
aop,ate,nt
aop,ate), as deﬁned in Section 2.1. We denote the reported opinion of
aop aboutate as ˆ Rt
aop,ate = ( ˆ mt
aop,ate, ˆ nt
aop,ate). This distinction is important becauseaop may
not reveal Rt
aop,ate truthfully, for reasons of self-interest. The truster, atr, must form a single
trust value from all such opinions it receives. Assuming that opinions are independent, then
an elegant and efﬁcient solution to this problem is to enumerate the successful and unsuc-
cessful interactions from all the reports it receives, where p is the total number of reports
(see Equation 8). The resulting values, denoted Natr,ate and Matr,ate respectively, represent
the reputation of ate from the perspective of atr. These values can then be used to calculate
shape parameters (see Equation 9) for a beta distribution, to give a trust value determined by
opinions provided from others. In addition, the truster considers any direct experience it has
with the trustee, by adding its own values for natr,ate and matr,ate with the same equation.
The effect of combining opinions in this way is illustrated in Fig. 2. In this ﬁgure, part
(a) shows a beta distribution representing one agent’s opinion, along with the attributes of
the distribution that have been discussed so far. In contrast to this, part (c) illustrates the
differences between the distribution in part (a) and distributions representing the opinions
of two other agents with different experiences. The result of combining all three opinions is
illustrated in part (b), of which there are two important characteristics. First, the distribution
with parameters α = 13 and β = 10 is based on more observations than the remaining two
distributions put together, and so has the greatest impact on the shape and expected value
of the combined distribution. This demonstrates how conﬂicts between different opinions
are resolved: the combined trust value is essentially a weighted average of the individual
opinions, where opinions with higher conﬁdence values are given greater weight. Second,
the variance of the combined distribution is strictly greater than any one of the component
distributions. This reﬂects that fact that it is based on more observations overall, and so has
a greater conﬁdence value.
Natr,ate =
p 
k=0
ˆ nak,ate, Matr,ate =
p 
k=0
ˆ mak,ate (8)
α = Matr,ate + 1a n dβ = Natr,ate + 1( 9 )Auton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 12: 183–198 189
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Fig. 2 Example beta distributions for aggregating opinions of 3 agents
The desirable feature of this approach is that, provided Conditions 1 and 2 hold, the
resulting trust value and conﬁdence level is the same as it would be if all the observations
had been observed directly by the truster itself. However, this also assumes that the way in
which different agents assess a trustee’s behaviour is consistent. That is, a truster’s opinion
providers categorise an interaction as successful, or unsuccessful, in the same way as the
truster itself.
Condition 1 (Common Behaviour) The behaviour of the trustee must be independent of the
identity of the truster with which it is interacting. Thus:
∀ate, ∀aop, Batr,ate = Batr,aop
Condition 2 (Truth Telling) The reputation provider must report its observations accurately
and truthfully. Thus:
∀ate, ∀aop, Rt
aop,ate = ˆ Rt
aop,ate
Unfortunately, however, we cannot expect these conditions to hold in a broad range of situa-
tions. For instance, a trustee may value interactions with one agent more than with another,
so it might therefore commit more resources to the valued agent to increase its success rate,
thus introducing a bias in its perceived behaviour. Similarly, in the case of a rater’s opinion
of a trustee, it is possible that the rater has an incentive to misrepresent its true view of the
trustee. Such an incentive could have a positive or a negative effect on a trustee’s reputation;
if a strong cooperative relationship exists between trustee and rater, the rater may choose to
overestimate its likelihood of success, whereas a competitive relationship may lead the rater
to underestimate the trustee. Due to these possibilities, we consider the methods of dealing
withinaccuratereputationsourcesanimportantrequirementforacomputationaltrustmodel.
In the next section, we introduce our solution to this requirement, building upon the basic
model introduced thus far.
3. Filtering inaccurate reputation
Inaccurate reputation reports arise when either Condition 1 or Condition 2 is broken, due to
an opinion provider being malevolent or a trustee behaving inconsistently towards different
agents. In both cases, an agent must be able to assess the reliability of the reports passed to
it, and the general solution is to adjust or ignore opinions judged to be unreliable (in order to
reduce their effect on the trustee’s reputation). There are two basic approaches to achieving
this that have been proposed in the literature; Jøsang et al. [9] refer to these as endogenous
and exogenous methods. The former attempt to identify unreliable reputation information by190 Auton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 12: 183–198
considering the statistical properties of the reported opinions alone [3, 18], while the latter
rely on other information to make such judgements, such as the reputation of the source or
its relationship with the trustee (e.g. [1, 19, 10]).4
Many proposals for endogenous techniques assume that inaccurate or unfair raters are
generally in a minority among reputation sources, and thus consider reputation providers
whose opinions deviate in some way from mainstream opinion to be those most likely to be
inaccurate.Oursolutionisexogenous,inthatwejudgeareputationproviderontheperceived
accuracy of its past opinions, rather than its deviation from mainstream opinion. Moreover,
we deﬁne a two step-method as follows. First, we calculate the probability that an agent will
provide an accurate opinion given its past opinions and later observed5 interactions with the
trustees for which opinions were given. Second, based on this value, we reduce the distance
between a rater’s opinion and the prior belief that all possible values for an agent’s behaviour
are equally probable. Once all the opinions collected about a trustee have been adjusted in
this way, the opinions are aggregated using the technique described above. In so doing, we
reduce the inﬂuence that an opinion provider has on a truster’s assessment of a trustee, if
the provider’s opinion is consistently biased in one way or another. This can be true either if
the provider is malevolent, or if a signiﬁcant number of trustees behave differently towards
the truster than toward the opinion provider in question.
We describe this technique in more detail in the remainder of this section: ﬁrst we detail
how the probability of accuracy is calculated, and then we show how opinions are adjusted
and the combined reputation obtained. An example of how these techniques can be used is
also given with the aid of a walkthrough scenario in [12] and [16].
3.1. Estimating the probability of accuracy
The ﬁrst stage in our solution is to estimate the probability that a rater’s stated opinion of a
trustee is accurate, which depends on the value of the current opinion under consideration,
denoted ˆ Raop,ate = ( ˆ maop,ate, ˆ naop,ate). Speciﬁcally, if Er is the expected value of a beta
distribution Dr, such that αr =ˆ maop,ate + 1a n dβr =ˆ naop,ate + 1, we can estimate the
probability that Er lies within some margin of error around Batr,ate, which we call the accu-
racy of aop according to atr, denoted as ρatr,aop. To perform this estimation, we consider the
outcomes of all previous interactions for which aop provided an opinion similar to ˆ Raop,ate
about ate,t oatr, for each ate. Using these outcomes, we construct a beta distribution, Do for
which, if its expected value Eo is close to Er,t h e naop’s opinions are generally correlated
to what is actually observed, and we can judge aop’s accuracy to be high. Conversely, if Er
deviates signiﬁcantly from Eo,t h e naop has low accuracy.
The process of achieving this estimation is illustrated in Fig. 3, in which the range of
possiblevaluesof Er and Eo isdividedintoﬁveintervals(orbins),bin1 =[ 0,0.2],...,bin5
=[ 0.8,1].Thesebinsdeﬁnewhichopinionsweconsidertobesimilartoeachother,suchthat
all opinions that lie in the same bin are considered alike. This is necessary because we may
never see enough opinions from the same provider to assess an opinion based on identical
opinions in the past. Instead, the best we can do is consider the perceived accuracy of past
opinions that do not deviate signiﬁcantly from the opinion under consideration. In the case
illustated in the ﬁgure, the opinion provider, aop, has provided atr with an opinion with an
expected value in bin4. Now, if we therefore consider all previous interaction outcomes for
4 More information on such alternative techniques can be found in [16] and Section 5.
5 These are observations made by the truster after it has obtained an opinion.Auton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 12: 183–198 191
Fig. 3 Illustration of ρatr,aop Estimation Process
which aop provided an opinion to atr in bin4, the portion of successful outcomes, and thus
Eo,isalsoinbin4,soρatr,aop ishigh.Ifsubsequentoutcome-opinionpairswerealsotofollow
this trend, then Do would be highly peaked inside this interval, and ρatr,aop would converge
to 1. Conversely, if subsequent outcomes disagreed with their corresponding opinions, then
ρatr,aop would approach 0.
More speciﬁcally, we divide the range of possible values of Er into N disjoint intervals
bin1,...,binn, then calculate Er, and ﬁnd the interval, bino, that contains the value of Er.
Then, if Hatr,aop is the set of all pairs of the form (Oatr,ax, ˆ Raop,ax),w h e r eax ∈ A,a n d
Oatr,ax is the outcome of an interaction for which, prior to being observed by atr, aop gave
the opinion ˆ Raop,ax, we can ﬁnd the subset Hr
atr,aop ⊆ Hatr,aop, which comprises all pairs
for which the opinion’s expected value falls in bino. We then count the total number of pairs
in Hr
atr,aop for which the interaction outcome was successful (denoted Csuccess) and those for
which it was not (denoted Cfail). Based on these frequencies, the parameters for Do can be
deﬁned as αo = Csuccess + 1a n dβo = Cfail + 1. Using Do, we now calculate ρatr,aop as the
portion of the total mass of Do that lies in the interval bino (see Equation 10).
ρatr,aop =
 max(bino)
min(bino) Xαo−1(1 − X)βo−1dX
 1
0 Uαo−1(1 − U)βo−1dU
(10)
Each truster performs these operations to determine the probability of accuracy of re-
ported opinions. However, one implication of this technique is that the number (and size) of
bins effectively determines an acceptable margin of error in opinion provider accuracy: the
estimated accuracy of a larger set of opinion providers converges to 1 with large bin sizes,
as opposed to small sizes.
3.2. Adjusting reputation source opinions
To describe how we adjust reputation opinions, we must introduce some new notation. First,
let Dc be the beta distribution that results from combining all of a trustee’s reputation infor-
mation (using Equations 8 and 9). Second, let Dc−r be a distribution constructed using the
same equations, except that the opinion under consideration, ˆ Raop,ate, is omitted. Third, let
¯ D be the result of adjusting the opinion distribution Dr, according to the process described
below.Finally,werefertothestandarddeviation(denotedσ),expectedvalueandparameters192 Auton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 12: 183–198
of each distribution by using the respective superscript; for instance, Dc has parameters αc
and βc, with standard deviation σc and expected value Ec.
Now, our goal is to reduce the effect of unreliable opinions on Dc. In essence, by adding
ˆ Raop,ate to a trustee’s reputation, we move Ec in the direction of Er. The standard deviation
of Dr contributestotheconﬁdencevalueforthecombinedreputationvaluebut,moreimpor-
tantly, its value relative to σc−r determines how far Ec will move towards Er. This effect
has important implications: consider as an example three distributions d1, d2 and d3, with
shape parameters, expected value and standard deviation as shown in Table 1; the results of
combining d1 with each of the other two distributions are shown in the last two rows. As can
be seen, distributions d2 and d3 have identical expected values with standard deviations of
0.025 and 0.005 respectively. Although the difference between these values is small (0.02),
the result of combining d1 with d2 is quite different from combining d1 and d3. Whereas the
expected value in the ﬁrst case falls approximately between the expected values for d1 and
d2, the relatively small parameter values of d1 compared to d3 in the latter case, means that
d1 has virtually no impact on the combined result. Obviously, this is due to our method of
reputation combination (see Equation 8), in which the parameter values are summed. This is
important because it shows how, if left unchecked, an unfair rater could deliberately increase
the weight an agent places on its opinion by providing very large values for m and n which,
in turn, determine α and β.
Inlightofthis,weadoptanapproachthatsigniﬁcantlyreducesveryhighparametervalues
unless the probability of the rater’s opinion being accurate is very close to 1. Speciﬁcally,
we reduce the distance between, respectively, the expected value and standard deviation of
Dr, and the expected value and standard deviation of the uniform distribution, α = β = 1,
which represents a state of no information (see Equations 11 and 12). Here, we denote the
standard deviation of the uniform distribution as σuniform and its expected value as Euniform.
By adjusting the standard deviation in this way, rather than changing the α and β parame-
ters directly, we ensure that large parameter values are decreased more than smaller values.
We adjust the expected value to guard against cases where we do not have enough reliable
opinions to mediate the effect of unreliable opinions; if we did not adjust the expected value
then, in the absence of any other information, we would take an opinion source’s word as
true, even if we did not consider its opinion reliable.
¯ E = Euniform + ρatr,aop · (Er − Euniform) (11)
¯ σ = σuniform + ρatr,aop · (σr − σuniform) (12)
Once we have determined the values of ¯ E and ¯ σ, we use Equations 13 and 14 to ﬁnd the
parameters ¯ α and ¯ β oftheadjusteddistribution,6 andfromthesewecalculateadjustedvalues
Table 1 Combination of beta distributions
Distribution αβE σ
d1 540 280 0.6585 0.0165
d2 200 200 0.5000 0.0250
d3 5000 5000 0.5000 0.0050
d1 + d2 740 480 0.6066 0.0140
d1 + d3 5540 5280 0.5120 0.0048
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for ˆ maop,ate and ˆ naop,ate,denotedas ¯ maop,ate and ¯ naop,ate respectively(seeEquation15).These
scaled versions of ˆ maop,ate and ˆ naop,ate are then used in their place to calculate the combined
trust value, as in Equation 8. Strictly speaking, ¯ maop,ate and ¯ naop,ate are not frequencies as
are their unadjusted counterparts, but have the same effect on the combined trust value as an
equivalent set of observations made by the truster itself. In general, as ρatr,aop approaches
0, both ¯ maop,ate and ¯ naop,ate will also approach 0. Thus, if ρatr,aop is 0 then no observation
reported by aop will affect atr’s decision making in any way.
¯ α =
¯ E2 − ¯ E3
¯ σ2 − ¯ E (13)
¯ β =
(1 − ¯ E)2 − (1 − ¯ E)3
¯ σ2 − (1 − ¯ E) (14)
¯ maop,ate =¯ α − 1, ¯ naop,ate = ¯ β − 1 (15)
4. Empirical evaluation
InthissectionwepresenttheresultsoftheempiricalevaluationperformedonTRAVOS.Our
discussion is structured as follows: Section 4.1 describes our evaluation testbed and overall
experimental methodology; Section 4.2 compares the reputation component of TRAVOS
to the most similar model found in the literature; and Section 4.3 investigates the overall
performanceofTRAVOSwhenbothdirectexperienceandreputationaretakenintoaccount.
4.1. Experiment methodology
Evaluation of TRAVOS took place using a simulated marketplace environment, consisting
of three distinct sets of agents: provider agents P ⊂ A, consumer agents C ⊂ A, and rep-
utation source agents S ⊂ A. For our purposes, the role of any c ∈ C is to evaluate τc,p
for all p ∈ P. Before each experiment the behaviour of each provider and reputation source
agent is set. Speciﬁcally, the behaviour of a provider p1 ∈ P is determined by the parameter
Bc,p1 as described in Section 2.1. Here, reputation sources are divided into three types that
deﬁne their behaviour: accurate sources report the number of successful and unsuccessful
interactions they have had with a given consumer without modiﬁcation; noisy sources add
gaussiannoisetothebetadistribution determinedfromtheirinteractionhistory,roundingthe
resulting expected value if necessary to ensure that it remains in the interval [0,1];a n dlying
sources attempt to maximally mislead the consumer by setting the expected value E[Bc,p]
to 1 − E[Bc,p].
Against this background, all experiments consisted of a series of episodes in which a
consumer was asked to assess its trust in all providers P. Based on these assessments, we
calculated the consumer’s mean estimation error for the episode (see Equation 16), giving us
a measure of the consumer’s performance on assessing the provider population as a whole.
Note that the value of this metric varies depending on the distribution of values of Bc,p
over the provider population. So, for simplicity, all the results described in the next sections
have been acquired for a population of 101 providers with values of Bc,p chosen uniformly
between 0 and 1 at intervals of 0.01, that is, the set {0,0.01,...,0.99,1}.
avg_estimate_err =
1
N
N 
i=1
abs(τc,pi − Bc,pi), where N is the no. of providers. (16)194 Auton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 12: 183–198
Table 2 Reputation source populations
Experiment No. of lying No. of noisy No. of accurate
100 2 0
2 0 10 10
302 00
41 0 0 1 0
52 0 0 0
In each episode, the consumer may draw upon both the opinions of reputation sources in
S and its own interaction history with both the providers and reputation sources. However,
to ensure that the results of each episode are independent, the interaction history between all
agents is cleared before every episode, and re-populated according to set parameters. All the
resultsdiscussedbelowhavebeentestedforstatisticalsigniﬁcanceusingAnalysisofVariance
techniques and Scheffé tests. It should also be noted that although the results presented are
obtainedfromcomputersimulationsrelatingtoourmarketplacescenario,theirscopeextends
to real world computer systems such as large scale open systems and peer-to-peer networks.
4.2. TRAVOS vs. the beta reputation system
Of the existing computational trust models in the literature, the most similar to TRAVOS is
theBetaReputationSystem(BRS)(discussedinSection5).LikeTRAVOS,thisusesthebeta
family of probability functions to calculate the posterior probability of a trustee’s behaviour
holding a certain value, given past interactions with that trustee. However, the models differ
signiﬁcantly in their approach to handling inaccurate reputation. TRAVOS assesses each
reputation source individually, based on the perceived accuracy of past opinions, while BRS
assumes that the majority of reputation sources provide an accurate opinion, and ignores
any opinions that deviate signiﬁcantly from the average. Since BRS does not differentiate
between reputation and direct observations, we have focused our evaluation on scenarios in
which consumers have no personal experience, and must therefore rely on reputation alone.
Toshowvariationinperformancedependingonreputationsourcebehaviour,weranexper-
iments with populations containing accurate and lying reputation sources, and populations
containing accurate and noisy sources. In each case, we kept the total number of sources
equal to 20, but ran separate experiments in which the percentage of accurate sources was
set to 0%, 50% and 100% (Table 2). Figure 4 shows the mean estimation error of TRAVOS
and BRS with these different reputation source populations averaged over 50 independent
episodes in each experiment. To provide a benchmark, the ﬁgure also shows the mean esti-
mation error of a consumer c0.5, which keeps τc0.5,p = 0.5f o ra l lp ∈ P. This is plotted
against the number of previous interactions that have occurred between the consumer and
each reputation source.
Ascanbeseen,inpopulationscontaininglyingagents,themeanestimationerrorofTRA-
VOS is consistently less than or equal to that of BRS. Moreover, estimation errors decrease
signiﬁcantly for TRAVOS as the number of consumer to reputation source interactions in-
creases, while BRS’s performance remains constant, since it does not learn from past experi-
ence.Bothmodelsperformconsistentlybetterthanc0.5 inpopulationscontaining50%or0%
liars. However, in populations containing only lying sources, both models were sufﬁciently
misled to perform worse than c0.5, but TRAVOS suffered less from this effect than BRS.
Speciﬁcally, when the number of past consumer to reputation interactions is low, TRAVOSAuton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 12: 183–198 195
Fig. 4 TRAVOS Reputation system vs. BRS
beneﬁts from its initially conservative belief in reputation source opinions. The beneﬁt is
enhanced further as the consumer becomes more skeptical with experience.
Similarresultscanbeseeninpopulationscontainingnoisysources,howeverperformance
was better because noisy source opinions are generally not as misleading as lying source
opinions. TRAVOS still outperforms BRS in most cases, except when the population con-
tains only noisy sources. In this case, BRS has a small but statistically signiﬁcant advantage
when the number of consumer to reputation source interactions is less than 10. We believe
this occurs because the gaussion noise added to such opinions had a mean of 0, so noisy
sources still provided accurate information on average. Thus, the BRS approach of removing
outlying opinions may be successful at removing those noisy opinions that deviate signiﬁ-
cantly from the mean on any given cycle. However, this advantage decreases as TRAVOS
learns which opinions to avoid.
4.3. TRAVOS component performance
To evaluate the overall performance of TRAVOS, we compared three versions of the system
that used the following information respectively: direct interactions between the consumer
and providers; direct provider experience and reputation; and reputation information only.
In these experiments, we varied the number of interactions between the consumers and pro-
viders, and kept the number of consumer to reputation source interactions constant at 10. We
used the same reputation source populations as described in Section 4.2.
The mean estimation errors for a subset of these experiments are shown in Fig. 5. Using
only direct consumer to provider experience, the mean estimation error decreases as the
number of consumer to provider interactions increases. As would be expected, using both
information sources when the number of consumer to provider interactions is low results in
similar performance to using reputation information only. However, in some cases, the com-
bined model may provide marginally worse performance than using reputation only.7 This
can be attributed to the fact that TRAVOS will usually put more faith in direct experience
than reputation.
7 This effect was not considered signiﬁcant under a Scheffé test, but was considered signiﬁcant by Least Sig-
niﬁcantDifferenceTesting.Thelattertechniqueis,ingeneral,lessconservativeatconcludingthatadifference
between groups does exist.196 Auton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 12: 183–198
Fig. 5 TRAVOS component performance
With a population of 50% lying reputation sources, the combined model is misled enough
to temporarily increase its error rate above that of the direct only model. This is a symptom
of the relatively small number of consumer to reputation source interactions (10), which is
insufﬁcient for the consumer to completely discount all the reputation information as unreli-
able. The effect disappears when the number of such interactions is increased to 20, but these
results are not illustrated in this paper.
5. Related work
There are many computational models of trust, a review of which can be found in [13]. A
more detailed comparision of TRAVOS to related work can also be found in [16]. Gener-
ally, however, models not based on probability theory [7, 14, 20] calculate trust from hand-
crafted formulae that yield the desired results, but that can be considered somewhat ad hoc
(although approaches using information theory [15] and Dempster-Shafer theory [19] also
exist).
Probabilistic approaches are not commonly used in the ﬁeld of computational trust, but
therearesomemodelsintheliterature(e.g.)[8,11,10,18].Inparticular,theBetaReputation
System (BRS) [8] is a probabilistic trust model like TRAVOS, which is based on the beta
distribution. The system is centralised and speciﬁcally designed for online communities. It
works by users giving ratings to the performance of other users in the community, where
ratings consist of a single value that is used to obtain positive and negative feedback values.
These feedback values are then used to calculate shape parameters that determine the repu-
tation of the user the rating applies to. However, BRS does not show how it is able to cope
with misleading information.
Whitby et al. [18] extend the BRS and show how it can be used to ﬁlter unfair ratings,
either unfairly positive or negative, towards a certain agent. It is primarily this extension that
we compare to TRAVOS in Section 4.2. However their approach is only effective when a
signiﬁcant majority of available reputation sources are fair and accurate, and there are poten-
tially many important scenarios where this assumption does not hold. One example occurs
when no opinion providers have previously interacted with a trustee, in which case the only
agents that will provide an opinion are those with an incentive to lie. In TRAVOS, opinionAuton Agent Multi-Agent Sys (2006) 12: 183–198 197
providers that continually lie will have their opinions discarded, regardless of the proportion
of opinions about a trustee that are inaccurate.
Another method for ﬁltering inaccurate reputation is described by [19]. This is simi-
lar to TRAVOS, in that it rates opinion source accuracy based on subsequent observa-
tions of trustee behaviour. However, at this point the models diverge, and adopt different
methods for representing trust, grounding trust in trustee observations, and implement-
ing reputation ﬁltering. Further experimentation is required to compare this approach to
TRAVOS.
6. Conclusions and future work
Thispaperhaspresentedanovelmodeloftrustforuseinopenagentsystems.Itsmainbeneﬁts
are that it provides a mechanism for assessing the trustworthiness of others in situations both
in which the agents have interacted before and share past experiences, and in which there
is little or no past experience between them. Establishing the trustworthiness of others, and
then selecting the most trustworthy, gives an agent the ability to maximise the probability
that there will be no harmful repercussions from the interaction.
In situations in which an agent’s past experience with a trustee is low, it can draw upon
reputation provider opinions. However, in doing so, the agent risks lowering, rather than
increasing, assessment performance due to inaccurate opinions. TRAVOS copes with this
by having an initially conservative estimate in reputation accuracy. Through repeated inter-
actions with individual reputation sources, it learns to distinguish reliable from unreliable
sources. By empirical evaluation, we have demonstrated that this approach allows repu-
tation to be used to signiﬁcantly improve performance while guarding against the nega-
tive effects of inaccurate opinions. Moreover, TRAVOS can extract a positive inﬂuence
on performance from reputation, even when 50% of sources are intentionally misleading.
This effect is increased signiﬁcantly through repeated interactions with individual reputa-
tion sources. When 100% of sources are misleading, reputation has a negative effect on
performance. However, even in this case, performance is increased by gaining experience,
and it outperforms the most similar model in the literature, in the majority of scenarios
tested.
As it stands, TRAVOS assumes that the behaviour of agents does not change over time,
but in many cases this is an unsafe assumption. In particular we believe that agents may well
change their behaviour over time, and that some will have time-based behavioural strategies.
Future work will therefore include the removal of this assumption and will consider the fact
that very old experiences may not be relevant in predicting the behaviour of an individ-
ual. Further extensions to TRAVOS will include using the rich social metadata that exists
within a VO environment as prior information to incorporate into trust assessment within
the Bayesian framework. As described in the Introduction, VOs are social structures, and we
can draw out social data such as roles and relationships that exist both between VOs and VO
members. Using this as prior information should not only improve the overall accuracy of
trust assessment, but should also handle bootstrapping. That is, when neither the truster nor
its opinion providers have previous experience with a trustee, the truster can still assess the
trustee based on other information it may have available.
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